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Behavioral law and economics has raised serious questions
regarding rational choice theory, an essential underpinning of
neoclassical law and economics. 1 Rational choice theory, it seems,
does not describe very well how consumers behave or how markets
work. 2 Economists have taken the insights of behavioral scientists
in stride, and have begun to acknowledge that real people do not
make choices solely to maximize their expected utility as rational
choice theory would predict. 3 The descriptive project of economics
has been greatly enriched by the more complex story that
behavioralists are telling.
A rich literature has developed in law and economics as well,
incorporating the insights of behavioral scientists in order to
reconsider assumptions about the behavior of consumers and
firms, and the implication of those assumptions for laws
regulating consumer markets, among other things. 4  Legal
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1. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
2. See, e.g., id. at 1476-77 ("[Elach of the three bounds points to systematic...
departures from conventional economic models, and thus each of the three bears on
generating sound predictions and prescriptions for law.").
3. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past,
Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et al.
eds., 2004); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
4. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004);
Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68
LA. L. REV. 117 (2007); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the
Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of
Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law,
Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 362 (2007); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of
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scholars, however, concern themselves not only with describing
how people and markets behave, but also with how they ought to
behave, and how and to what extent the law should regulate
economic behavior. 5 In this normative aspect, behavioral law and
economics has clung stubbornly to goals of efficiency and
autonomy.8 These goals do not always appear to be well served by
the deregulation advocated by adherents of rational choice
theory. 7 Moreover, the triumph of efficiency as a legal norm has
led to legal structures and empirically observable market
outcomes that have harmed consumers, particularly vulnerable
and poor consumers, in ways that are profoundly troubling from
the standpoint of normative goals apart from efficiency. 8
The time has come to rethink the norms to be pursued by
consumer contract law. The time has come to replace the monistic
value system dominated by wealth-maximizing efficiency with a
pluralistic value system that seeks to balance the multiple and
sometimes competing goals of equity, justice, autonomy, and
efficiency in the law of these markets. Our improved empirical
description of consumer contracting behavior needs to be enriched
with an improved normative agenda. In particular, the law can
and should prevent seller exploitation, exploitation which often
consists of sellers understanding and using knowledge about
consumer behavior and bounded rationality. For the source of
these norms we need to look elsewhere besides efficiency and
utilitarianism.
By consumer contract law, I refer to the full range of common
law, statutes, uniform laws, and regulations that govern
transactions between consumers and firms, 9 including the law of
contract formation and enforcement, the Uniform Commercial
Code, the Consumer Credit Protection Act,' 0 section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)" and its state-law
equivalents,' 2 together with the myriad of statutes regulating
5. Cf. Edwards, supra note 4, at 395-421 (describing options for regulating
consumer rebates).
6. See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 3.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part 1.C.
9. See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 120 (2006) (proposing a
broader category of "individual contract," to which most of my discussion would
apply).
10. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (2006).
11. Federal Trade Commission Act §5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
12. Generically referred to as Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes
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specific business-to-consumer transactions. 13  The domain of
consumer contracts is a domain of standardized forms drafted by
merchants and offered with little if any opportunity for negotiation
of terms by the buyers. 14  Behavioral issues are thus
fundamentally different from those affecting individually
negotiated business-to-business contracts. 15
The efficiency norm has largely triumphed in the past
twenty-five years.16 In the name of efficiency, consumer contract
law has turned either to complete nonintervention (i.e.
deregulation) or to a focus on fixing market failures, such as using
disclosure mandates to ameliorate information asymmetries. 17
The United States has engaged in a vast experiment in
deregulation, which has yielded results that can be empirically
evaluated.' 8 Deregulation of consumer markets, as it turns out,
produces significant consumer harm, exploitation, and rent-
seeking, and does not necessarily increase consumer welfare. 19
The normative consequences of these insights have yet to be
fully elaborated. Scholars who point out the bounded rationality 20
of consumer behavior nevertheless cling to the utility
(UDAP) or "Little FTC Acts," these laws have been adopted in all fifty states. See
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (6th ed.
2004).
13. See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17
(2006) (regulating disclosures and payment of fees for real estate settlement
services); California Rental-Purchase Act, CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1812.620-1812.649
(West 1998) (regulating disclosures and remedies in rent-to-own consumer good
transactions).
14. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983); cf. Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit
Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1966) (comparing certain contracts in business
to using "invisible ink").
15. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(discussing the impact of "the status quo bias" on negotiated contracts).
16. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 773-75 (2002); see also infra Part I.C.
17. See Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 61
(1995) (using Supreme Court decisions on contract issues as a "barometer" and
finding a "laissez-faire approach").
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. Herbert Simon pioneered theories of bounded rationality and "satisficing" to
describe the complexity of real human behavior in the marketplace, including the
use of mental shortcuts and the practical limitations on gathering and evaluating
information. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261
(1957); see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003).
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maximization ideal, and seek legal solutions that will fix the
market failure.21 In my view, a single-minded focus on designing
legal systems to achieve the utilitarian maximization of market-
expressed "preferences" ignores both the reality of market
functioning and other equally important objectives of the law:
promoting equity and preventing exploitation of the economically
vulnerable. In other words, not only does the orthodox law and
economics approach to consumer contract law fail to achieve its
stated efficiency goals, its failure should cause us to question what
the law is doing pursuing this impoverished norm of efficiency in
the first place. It begs the question by taking its conclusion as its
premise. It is based on the following syllogism:
1. Markets are efficient.
2. Regulation of contracts interferes with markets.
3. Regulation is inefficient.
4. Regulation is bad.
While much recent literature explicitly or implicitly
challenges premise 1 and conclusions 3 and 4,22 the unstated zero
premise is that "efficiency is the goal." Put another way, the law
of contracts must be concerned with efficiency to the exclusion of
other norms. Now that the syllogism has broken down, it is time
to examine not only premise 1 and the conclusions, but also the
zero premise.
I. Rational Choice Theory and Deregulation
A. The Capture of Legal Culture by Rational Choice Theory
The legal culture of U.S. consumer contract law for the past
quarter century has been captured by the deregulation ideology of
law and economics. 23  Judges and lawyers share a common
language of consumer autonomy, in which contractual decisions
are arrived at by rational choice after careful review of contractual
information in a market with sellers vying to provide better
products at lower prices. 24 Rational choice theory posits that
21. See infra notes 233-249 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1376-77 (describing efficiency as a
"casualty" in the credit card market and advocating for regulation).
23. See infra Part I.C; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and
Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142-43 (2003) ("[T]here is no dispute that
law and economics has long been, and continues to be, the dominant theoretical
paradigm for understanding and assessing law and policy.).
24. See generally, Jacob Jacoby, Is it Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality?
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consumers have fixed preferences for goods and services, and that
they make choices with limited budgets in order to maximize the
fulfillment of their self-interested preferences (i.e., their expected
utility).25
In this construct, consumers are depicted as autonomous
actors who express their fixed, predetermined preferences by
spending their dollars or euros or yuan. 26 Sellers are imagined as
slaves to their consumer masters, constantly striving to offer the
products and services that fulfill the autonomous desires of
consumers at the lowest possible price.27 Any legal regulation that
interferes with voluntary contracts is depicted in this story as
making both consumers and sellers worse off.28 This story that
has captured our legal culture is fundamentally false, and does not
describe the behavior of consumers and sellers in the real world.
The historical moment when consumer law came to be
shaped by rational choice theory occurred in part as a reaction to
the equity-based jurisprudence that preceded it.29 In the 1960s
and 1970s Congress and the states enacted hundreds of consumer
protection laws regulating the process and content of consumer
contracts, 30  and the American Law Institute proposed
nonenforcement of standard form contract terms that were
inconsistent with a consumer's "reasonable expectation."' 31  In
contrast, the past twenty-five years of consumer legislation have
been dominated by deregulation and the vigorous enforcement of
consumer form contracts against consumers. 32  On the three
Some Consumer Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81, 98-122 (2000) (identifying Judge Posner as a proponent of
rational choice theory and describing the assumptions underlying the theory).
25. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 26-33 (2002)
(differentiating the various versions of rational choice theory); Jacoby, supra note
24, at 87.
26. See Jacoby, supra note 24, at 87-88.
27. Cf. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 23, at 161 ('[E]conomists are situationally
sensitive in only the narrowest sense-taking into account the way in which price
might influence people's actions based on their willingness to pay ... .
28. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
29. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 137 (1982)
("[Blusiness was able to exploit the diffuse public disaffection with government and
regulation to legitimize the dismantling of consumer and other regulations that
have retained undiminished popular support.").
30. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure
of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12 (1997).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1979); Alan M. White
& Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 233,
246-47 (2002).
32. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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occasions when the Supreme Court has decided consumer contract
issues, in 1991, 2000, and 2006, it has refused judicial intervention
in apparently one-sided form contract terms, 33 assuming that the
contracts at issue reflected the voluntary preferences of the
consumers, or at least that the law would be best served by
pretending that this was so. 34
Jon Hanson and David Yosifon described this phenomenon of
"maintaining... a false, though intuitive, worldview" as one
caused by "deep capture." 35 Because powerful corporations benefit
collectively from deregulation, it is in their interests to promote
the universal and invisible dominance of rational choice theory,
which he refers to as "dispositionism," i.e., the premise that
preferences are inherent in consumers' dispositions and are not
the product of situational factors, including manipulation by
sellers. 36 Business interests actively promoted the teaching and
writing that became neoclassical law and economics with generous
funding. 37 The law and economics dogma has become de rigeur in
American law schools, albeit the subject of continuing and critical
debate. 38 The continuing refusal of orthodox economists and legal
33. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding
that the illegality of an allegedly usurious payday loan was for the arbitrator to
decide under a mandatory arbitration term); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (upholding a mandatory arbitration clause in a
consumer loan); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
(upholding a forum-selection clause in a cruise ship ticket); see also Norfolk S. Ry.
Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 29 (2004) (noting that contract default rules should
achieve efficiency); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (rejecting the
contract interest rate on a subprime auto loan as the basis for discounting Chapter
13 payments to present value). But see Till, 541 U.S. at 491-508 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the contract rate should be used based on the assumption
that subprime lending markets are competitive and therefore efficient). In Till, the
plurality disagreed with the assumption about the efficiency of the subprime
market, but only because it found that government regulation may distort the
consumer credit market, and information problems may prevent consumers from
efficiently expressing their preferences and obtaining competitive prices. Till, 541
U.S. at 481-82. On a deeper level, both the plurality and dissenting opinions are
completely wedded to the tenets of rational choice theory.
34. See, e.g., Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90 ("[I]t is undisputed that the parties
agreed to arbitrate all claims relating to their contract ....
35. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 23, at 229.
36. Id. at 226.
37. Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored
Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or Is
the Money Earning the Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075, 1088-90 (2001).
38. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 23, at 140-43; see also David A. Hoffman
& Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?,
53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 347-51 (2002) (reviewing the Posner-Dworkin debate); Lewis
A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037 (2000)
(defending cost-benefit analysis against critiques).
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scholars to acknowledge real world evidence of human behavior
has been referred to as "autistic" economics by a small group of
dissenting scholars. 39  Where the law of consumer contracts is
made, in legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts, the basic
assumptions of rational choice theory are rarely if ever challenged,
and are now deeply embedded in the making of rules and deciding
of cases. 40
B. Rational Choice Theory as a Norm
While law and economics scholarship sometimes claims to be
agnostic as to the normative goals of law, and to offer only tools to
evaluate an aspect of legal choices, 41 it has directed attention to
utility maximization and cost-benefit analysis. 42 The law and
economics approach directs us to evaluate the efficiency of legal
rules.43 Efficiency has a specific definition in this context. The
minimalist Pareto formulation of efficiency tells us to favor any
outcome that improves at least one consumer or producer's utility
without diminishing the utility of any other person.44
The Kaldor-Hicks version of efficiency modifies this formula,
to approve any outcome that improves at least one person's
expected utility to such an extent that his or her surplus utility is
greater than any loss of utility to others. 45 In theory, if the
winners compensate the losers (by paying money, the yardstick of
utility), the winners would still have some excess utility and the
losers are no worse off, thus meeting the Pareto efficiency test.
46
When willingness to pay is used as the proxy for utility, then
39. See THE CRISIS IN ECONOMICS: THE POST-AUTISTIC ECONOMICS MOVEMENT:
THE FIRST 600 DAYS 1-9 (Edward Fullbrook ed., 2003). The word "autistic" is used
informally and imprecisely in this context to mean inward-looking or oblivious to
real-world evidence. Autism sufferers in fact are quite aware of the world around
them but suffer from seriously impaired communication that makes it appear to
others that they are self-absorbed.
40. See discussion infra Part I.C.
41. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-
10 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-16 (7th ed.
2007).
42. Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1791 (2003) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
43. Cf. id. at 1795-96 (outlining different efficiency formulations used "in
comparing different states of society").
44. See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 3; Farber, supra note 42, at
1795.
45. See JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and




efficiency amounts to aggregate wealth maximization. 47
Unfortunately, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that the
winners actually transfer their excess utility to the losers.48
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency begins rather rapidly to resemble wealth
maximization and utilitarianism, with their well-understood
shortcomings as ethical norms. 49
By giving primacy to consumers' "rational choice," the
descriptive project of law and economics has necessarily cast
interventionist legal rules as antifreedom and paternalistic. 50
Thus the agenda subtly shifts, from a positivist program of
identifying the laws of markets and how they actually function to
promote efficiency (or not), into an effort to delegitimize goals
other than efficiency as aims of the law.51 While there has been
considerable discussion in recent law and economics literature
about the efficiency norm, its moral justification, and how to
accommodate it to the decidedly inefficient preferences of real
consumers and real markets, 52 scholars in this field almost
universally remain committed, on a fundamental level, to a
utilitarian agenda. 53 The limitations of the efficiency norm, and
its possible alternatives, are discussed in Part III, below.
Translated to the real world of consumer markets, Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency means that the rules should be favored if their
47. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 119 (1979). There are of course many different versions of efficiency,
cost-benefit analysis, and rational choice theory in the academic literature. My
focus, however, is on what one might call the popular version that has come to
dominate legal discourse of judges, legislators, and regulatory agencies. That
version equates efficiency with the maximization of wealth and treats willingness
to pay as a cardinal measure of consumer preferences and, therefore, consumer
well-being. See Lind, supra note 45, at 318.
48. See Lind, supra note 45, at 318.
49. Id. at 314-19; see also Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 191, 194-96 (1980) (challenging the ethics of striving for wealth
maximization); discussion infra Part III.
50. See Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 38, at 338 ("policies of paternalism").
51. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 159 (2004).
52. See Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 38, at 347-52; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (2001) ("Welfare
economics thus accommodates all factors that are relevant to individuals' well-
being and to its distribution.").
53. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Incorporating Moral Constraints into
Economic Analysis (Sept. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931988 (proposing




aggregate benefits exceed their aggregate costs. 54 Conventionally,
this means that any voluntary contractual exchange should be
permitted. 55 If both the buyer and seller are willingly exchanging
money for goods or services, they must both be better off as a
result of the transaction. 56 Laws and regulations that interfere
with the making of contracts, or attempt to prescribe their content
(like laws limiting interest rates) are seen as inevitably causing
more harm than good, because they prevent voluntary
transactions that by hypothesis improve the lot of both the buyer
and seller. 57
But in order to measure costs and benefits, we need a
yardstick. This is where rational choice theory, with its
assumptions about consumer behavior and preferences, comes
in.5 8  In order to measure improvements to an individual
consumer's welfare, neoclassical economics observes the
consumer's willingness to pay, and the seller's asking price. 59 If a
consumer purchases a service, for example an extended warranty
for an automobile, the neoclassical economist assumes that the
highest price that the consumer is observed to pay reflects the
value of that consumer's innate preference for the peace of mind
and protection from risk that the warranty represents.60
Likewise, the lowest price at which a seller offers the warranty
represents the irreducible cost of providing the warranty plus the
seller's desired minimum profit.6 1
Rational choice theory requires that: A) a consumer has
fixed, predetermined preferences between and among all available
54. See Farber, supra note 42, at 1795.
55. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 45, at 319-20 (describing a hypothetical car
accident, where the one at fault would need to "compensate in a manner that
mimics a voluntary market transaction" to remedy the inefficiency).
56. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Resurrection of Contract, 82 CoLUM. L. REV.
184, 188 (1982).
57. See Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A
Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2005)
("[Efficiency theorists ... argue that voluntary transactions increase aggregate
levels of social welfare and ought to be enforced as a way of increasing wealth and
utility.").
58. See SEN, supra note 25, at 27 (summarizing emphasis of rational choice
theory).
59. See POSNER, supra note 41, at 9.
60. Id. at 11.
61. See id. ('The economic value of something is how much someone is willing
to pay for it or, if he has it already, how much money he demands for parting with
it."); see also Becher, supra note 4, at 120 ("[Cjontract law assumes that people
know what they want .... ").
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goods and services; 62 B) the consumer can assign a numerical
value, in the form of a price she is willing to pay, to any product
and any feature of any product, and; C) the consumer acts at all
times to maximize her expected utility, i.e., to fulfill as many
preferences as she can given her wealth budget. 63 As a normative
proposition, rational choice theory holds that the consumer's
expression of her preferences through purchasing decisions are the
best possible measure of the consumer's well-being.64
This yardstick of consumer welfare loses its appeal, however,
if the consumer's willingness to pay, e.g., for a warranty, is not
fixed, but is instead heavily influenced by situational factors, some
of which the seller can control and manipulate. 65 Moreover, the
consumer's willingness to pay in the real world is skewed by a
variety of biases and predictable misperceptions that are also well
understood by the seller.66  If the consumer begins by
miscalculating the objective value of the warranty because of the
overconfidence bias 67 or the availability heuristic, 68 and then has
her calculations further influenced by the seller framing the
warranty as avoiding loss rather than seeking a gain,69 what has
62. Jolls, et al., supra note 1, at 1476 (explaining accounting principles of
economics).
63. See Willis, supra note 4, at 741, 742 (summarizing postulates of neoclassical
economics).
64. See Korobkin, supra note 15, at 118 (explaining rational choice theory's
assumption that parties will act to maximize wealth).
65. E.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing
of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S254-S259 (Oct. 1986) (examining how descriptive
variance influences choice).
66. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 4, 754-98 (listing, comprehensively, tactics used
against consumers by predatory lenders).
67. Overconfidence bias is the tendency to believe in a higher likelihood of
success and a lower likelihood of failure of future projects than is objectively
reasonable. See generally Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success:
How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions, HARv. Bus. REV., July 2003, at
56, 56 (discussing executives' tendency to overestimate benefits and underestimate
costs). Thus, a consumer might believe a warranty is unnecessary because of her
belief in her good maintenance practices or general good luck.
68. The availability heuristic is the tendency to measure the probability of
unusual events based on personal or personally known experience. See Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) ("A person is said to employ the
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease
with which instances or associations could be brought to mind.").
69. Framing effects result in consumers having different preferences in making
the identical choice, depending on how the choice is presented. See generally
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65, at S272. In particular, individuals tend to
"prefer" a choice that is framed as avoiding a loss over the same choice when
presented as a possible gain. Id. at S254, S259; see also McCoy, supra note 4, at
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happened to our fixed yardstick of consumer welfare?
If behavioral science tells us that a consumer's purchasing
decisions do not offer a good yardstick for that consumer's
objective welfare, then the goal of maximizing the consumer's
freedom to purchase loses its luster. Before turning to the
evidence of non-rational consumer market behavior and its
implications for the law, it is imperative to understand the extent
to which rational choice theory has come to dominate the practice
and theory of consumer contract law.
C. Rational Choice Theory and Its Normative Agenda
Translated into Legal Practice: Legislatures,
Administrative Agencies, and Courts
Beginning around 1980, Congress progressively preempted
most state usury laws, 70 while contract law in general became less
regulated.71 While the initial deregulation of first mortgage
interest rates was partly unintentional, 72 it was the leading edge
of a wave. 73 Two United States Supreme Court decisions have
resulted in the effective state deregulation of credit card rates and
fees. 74 Initially, the Court permitted national banks to "export"
the interest rate laws of their home state to other states in which
730 (illustrating that people make different choices depending on how outcomes are
framed).
70. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to "HEL" was Paved with Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 476 (2000).
71. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 767 (comparing the "rules-based" system of
the early twentieth century contract law with the later "standards-based" system);
id. at 774 ("[W]ith privatizing and deregulation the new order of the day, contract
law was now to be regarded as just one of many legal spheres in which the free
market should be allowed to dominate to the greatest extent possible.").
72. High interest rates in the late 1970s caused market rates for mortgages to
temporarily exceed limits in state statutes, and in the case of Arkansas, state
constitutional limits. Mansfield, supra note 70, at 476. Congress responded with
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, preempting
state laws limiting the interest rate on first-lien mortgages. Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a
(1994). It is unclear whether the members of Congress voting for this provision
understood that no higher or more flexible federal interest rate ceiling was going to
replace the preempted state laws. See Mansfield, supra note 70, at 476 (giving a
comprehensive overview of the mortgage market and legislation in the 1970s and
1980s).
73. See, e.g., Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-
3806 (2001) (preempting state regulation of alternative mortgage transactions in
the interest of eliminating their discriminatory impact on non-federally chartered
creditors).
74. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Marquette Nat'l
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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they did business, under the National Bank Act. 75 Then the Court
broadly defined the payment components that come under the
National Bank Act preemption umbrella. 76 As a result, certain
states have removed interest rate and fee restrictions to attract
national banks, creating a "race to the bottom" in which other
states' legislators began competing to offer a more attractively
deregulated environment. 77
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC or
Commission) interpretation of its broad consumer protection
mandate has evolved dramatically in the past twenty-five years. 78
Section 5 of the FTC Act calls for the agency to prohibit "unfair
and deceptive practices" in the marketplace. 79 The FTC has
shifted its core interpretation of the "unfairness" prong
dramatically, adopting economic efficiency as its touchstone with
some encouragement from Congress.80 In the 1970s, under Chair
Michael Pertschuk, the FTC considered regulating television
advertising to children as unfair, and sought to take on other
commercial practices viewed as harmful to the public welfare or to
particular groups of consumers.81  Congress responded by
amending section 5 to circumscribe the concept of unfairness,
limiting it to practices that caused measurable economic harm to
consumers, and requiring cost-benefit analysis of unfairness
regulations.8 2  The cost-benefit amendment implicitly adopts
utilitarian efficiency as the norm.83  It requires that FTC
75. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 313 (allowing a national bank to export interest
rate rules of its home state to operations in other states).
76. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740 (holding that late charges were within the
National Bank Act's statutory definition of "interest" and therefore subject to the
state law of a national bank's home state).
77. See Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of
Financial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 66 (1996) (explaining that the
character of a "dual banking system" leads to state deregulation in order to have a
choice between state and national banks).
78. See generally William F. Adkinson, Jr., Introduction: Federal Trade
Commission 90th Anniversary Symposium, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 749 (2004) (giving a
brief synopsis of articles dealing with a myriad of FTC issues, including the
Agency's evolving history).
79. Federal Trade Commission Act §5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
80. Michael Pertschuk, former FTC Chair, gives an entertaining and
informative explanation for the FTC's shift from a focus on overregulation of family
values to deregulation and economics. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST
REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 69-117 (1982).
81. Id. at 69.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also PERTSCHUK, supra note 80, at 73.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (using language such as "consumers" and "substantial
injury" to limit the section's application to issues of quantifiable economic harm).
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consumer protection rules achieve Kaldor-Hicks efficiency by
maximizing aggregate utility.8 4 To put it another way, Congress
has prohibited the FTC from making interpersonal comparisons of
utility other than on the basis of willingness to pay.
Since Congress acted, the FTC has rarely issued regulations
broadly applicable to contract terms on the basis of unfairness.
8 5
The Credit Practices Rule banned as unfair six different consumer
contract terms or practices: confessions of judgment, pre-default
wage assignments, non-purchase money security interests in
household goods, exemption waivers, pyramiding late charges, and
failure to provide a mandatory warning notice to cosigners8
6
The Credit Practices Rule is replete with the language of
rational choice theory and utility maximization.8 7 Accordingly, the
contract terms that are banned are evaluated solely based on
whether the economic savings to the merchants exist and outweigh
the dollar cost of the terms to consumers.88 Contractual wage
assignments, for example, are not condemned as an oppressive use
of economic power and leverage to deprive working people of their
wages.8 9 They are banned because they do not appear in actual
market practice to provide much dollar return to creditors and
collectors, and because markets that already ban them in various
states were found not to have lost any economic benefit as a result
of the bans. 90
Moreover, since adoption of the Credit Practices Rule, the
FTC has retreated even further from any substantive regulation of
consumer contract terms, and indeed it is difficult to imagine the
present Commission enacting the Credit Practices Rule, even
84. See Lind, supra note 45, at 310 ("Kaldor-Hicks ... involves sacrificing the
utility of individuals in order to maximize the wealth of society and treats wealth
as the ultimate good.").
. 85. See J. Howard Beales, III, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise,
Fall, and Resurrection, http://www.ftc.gov/speechesfbeales/unfair0603.shtm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2008) (detailing the history of the unfairness doctrine in the FTC).
86. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R pt. 444 (2007).
87. See Credit Practice Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740 (Mar. 1, 1984) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 444).
88. See id. at 7743-44 (defining substantial injury as "economic or monetary"
and noting that "violation . . . prevents the forces of supply and demand from
maximizing benefits and minimizing costs").
89. See generally id. at 7755-61 (indicating that the Commission looks at both
the harm to consumers participating in wage assignment (particularly employment
relationships and family welfare) as well as the benefits (most prevalently the
borrowing ability of those with bad credit), and that ultimately, it is a weighing of
each side, economically, that tips the scales against wage assignment).
90. See id. at 7755-61.
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couched as it is in its utility maximization rationale. 91 Deborah
Platt Majoras, chair of the FTC from 2004 to 2008, equates
consumer protection to the promotion of free competition, privacy
of consumer information, correction of information problems, and
prevention of deception that impair efficient markets, which result
in the enhancement of consumer welfare. 92  Her predecessor,
Timothy Muris, who served from 2001 to 2004, was also an
emphatic supporter of deregulated markets and their presumed
superiority over government regulation. 93
In the courts, a similar dominance of rational choice theory is
apparent. 94 To take one example, section 211 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, which calls for nonenforcement of standard
form contract terms if they are contrary to a consumer's
"reasonable expectations," 95 has gained little or no traction. 96 One
court described the idea of analyzing adhesion contracts as
something other than voluntary agreements based on autonomous
preferences as introducing "the serpent of uncertainty in the Eden
of contract enforcement." 97  In upholding the FTC's Credit
Practices Rule against a challenge by a credit industry trade
association, the D.C. Court of Appeals approved the rationale that
"unfair," for purposes of the FTC Act, was the same as not being
the result of an efficient market. 98 Thus, if the FTC finds a
market failure, then it may regulate a practice in order to restore
the state of affairs that the imaginary competitive market would
91. See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC's
Consumer Protection Agenda: Strategies for the Present and Future, Remarks
before American Bar Association Antitrust Section (Jan. 30, 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070130ABAConsumerProtection.pdf (calling
competition and consumer protection a "complimentary set of tools").
92. See id.
93. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 23, at 239-40 (citing Kenneth W.
Clarkson & Timonthy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade Commission: The
Case of Occupational Regulation, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 77 (1980)).
94. See, e.g., White & Mansfield, supra note 31, at 240 (discussing the negative
impact of policies such as "duty-to-read," which ostensibly make consumers and
merchants equal bargainers, on those unable to read or understand contract
terms).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f(1979).
96. The exception has been for cases involving the sale of insurance, and even
those decisions appear consistent with rational choice theory and freedom of
contract, focusing as they do on the special information problems that insurance
contracts present. White & Mansfield, supra note 31, at 246-50.
97. Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997).




have (efficiently) produced. 99 Similarly, the efforts of merchants to
persuade and change consumers' preferences, an activity that
according to rational choice theory should be futile, is given
protection of a constitutional dimension under the commercial
speech doctrine, because such communication is presumed to be
informative and promote the efficient fulfillment of consumer
preferences. 100
Thus have lawmakers participated in a systematic self-
delusion as to the functioning and desirability of deregulated
markets. I will now turn to the evidence, both from the behavioral
economists' experimental evidence and from real world empirical
examples in particular markets, that the rational choice model of
consumer markets is fundamentally false.
II. Behavioral Law & Economics: How Consumers and
Sellers Really Behave
People simply do not behave in the ways that neoclassical
economists assume they do, or ought to. 101 In the past ten years,
there has been an explosion of legal scholarship drawing on
empirical research from economics and the behavioral sciences
about consumer and seller economic behavior. 10 2 This research
discredits the utility maximization narrative. 103 People, it seems,
do not approach the marketplace with a series of predetermined
preferences, precisely and numerically weighted, seeking like a
computer algorithm the package of goods and services that
maximizes the fulfillment of their preferences at the lowest cost. 104
Instead, consumer choices result from a wide range of consumer
99. See id. (examining "reasonably avoidable" to determine that markets
leaving consumers with other than optimal choices were unfair for purposes of the
FTC Act).
100. See Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1236 (10th Cir.
2005) ("Operating in an economy featuring informed consumers and an efficient
allocation of resources clearly benefits both sellers and buyers. Therefore, the
injury incurred through the deprivation of commercial speech rights cannot be
quantified solely in terms of transaction costs and lost profits to a single market
participant.").
101. See supra part I.A. (explaining neoclassical economics' assumptions about
human behavior).
102. See supra note 4.
103. See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 6 (commenting on research
that determined unavoidable anomalies in utility maximization theory); see also
Jacoby, supra note 24, at 84 ("Rational Choice Theory is a simplistic theory having
little correspondence with the real world of (individual) consumer behavior.").
104. See Jacoby, supra note 2425, at 84.
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strategies and seller influences.105 People's preferences are highly
contingent on situational factors, such as the framing of choices
and the channels by which choices are offered, and are thus
readily subject to seller manipulation. 106 Consumers "satisfice,"
that is, they accept the first products and services offered to them
that minimally meet their needs, or are perceived to do So. 10 7 Real
people employ mental short cuts, "heuristics," that sellers can
exploit, such as using the initial monthly payment as a proxy for
the cost of credit.' 08 To describe consumer purchasing in the
modern market as an expression of individual autonomy is
misleading in the extreme.
Patricia McCoy and Lauren Willis have explored the
application of behavioral research to an important current
example of consumer exploitation, namely predatory mortgage
lending. 10 9 Professor McCoy identifies a number of consumer
behaviors to explain how it is that risky and expensive mortgage
products have been so successfully sold to so many American
homeowners. 110 She argues that predatory lenders use framing
effects to present credit choices in ways that obfuscate the risks
and overstate the benefits of risky mortgage loans."' They exploit
consumers' tendency to use a monthly payment amount as a
(misleading) proxy for the price of credit, and characterize bad
loans as a means to avoid important losses. 112
Professor Willis offers a comprehensive review of the biases
and situational factors that might lead consumers to fall victim to
predatory lending, as well as some of the seller behaviors that
exploit consumer vulnerability and lead them to enter into
105. See id. at 88-90 (listing word-of-mouth, packaging, and retail atmosphere
as a few of these competing stimuli).
106. E.g. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65, at S254-S255 (noting that a
study of preferences between medical treatments indicated that the framing of
statistics affects the type of treatment respondents prefer).
107. Willis, supra note 4, at 769.
108. See McCoy, supra note 4, at 736 (analyzing the use of heuristics by
inexperienced borrowers, which increases their vulnerability to predatory lending).
109. E.g., McCoy, supra note 4; Willis, supra note 4.
110. See McCoy, supra note 4, at 726 (noting that depending on consumers'
inexperience, aversion to certain loss, frame of reference, and financial hardships,
lenders are able to sell high-risk mortgages to those least capable of appreciating
their content).
111. Id. at 731 (explaining that because people are typically strongly adverse to
loss, predatory lenders frame high-risk loans as large cash gains followed by
reasonable payments).
112. Id. at 736 (explaining the downward spiral inexperienced borrowers are
susceptible to, as increasingly unequal borrowing arrangements are entered into in
order to stave off immediate debt).
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harmful and risky mortgage loans. 113 In addition to the price
heuristics, framing effects, and information problems discussed by
Professor McCoy, Professor Willis identifies abbreviated reasoning
and a focus on salient product features, the affective significance of
having one's application for credit approved, and the reliance on
intermediaries to avoid decision making stress as other factors
enabling predatory lending. 114
Likewise, consumers do not ruthlessly take on credit card
and other debt based on rational strategies relying on the
availability of discharge of debts under the Bankruptcy Code.
115
Instead, overconfidence bias, using monthly payments as a proxy
for the cost of credit, hyperbolic discount rates, and self-control
problems, which are all systematically exploited by purveyors of
credit, combine to cause consumers to over-borrow.
116
Drawing on the experimental evidence, I propose to apply the
insights of behavioral economics to the problem of consumer
contract law more generally. I also propose to incorporate
empirical evidence regarding actual consumer behavior in the
marketplace in order to supplement the insights gained from
psychology experiments performed on college students.
A. Consumer Behavioral Biases and Shortcuts
1. Situation Matters: Defaults, Decisional Overload,
Framing, and Affective Factors
While rational choice theory posits that consumers have
predetermined preferences, and that their behavior will always
113. See generally Willis, supra note 4 (analyzing the effect of psychological
biases on borrowers, and thereby uncovering serious flaws in approaching home
mortgages with the assumption that borrowers act rationally, or even in their own
best interests).
114. See id. at 766 (noting that borrowers suffer from information overload,
which leads to narrowing the scope of comparison to a few key issues). Consumers
tend to rely on avoiding negative emotions while seeking positive ones, which also
makes them vulnerable to lender manipulation. Id. at 769-71. Similarly, loan
approval for those who believe themselves to have poor credit can be marketed by
lenders either as an affirmation of the borrower's worth or as a warning against
attempting to get a better rate. Id. at 775. Borrowers rely on lenders to explain
the loan process and act in their best interest. Id. at 798. This trust offers lenders
yet another avenue for borrower exploitation. Id.
115. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 4, at 1481-82 (critiquing the theory
that the rise in bankruptcy is due to deliberate consumer action, which therefore
should be curtailed by more stringent bankruptcy laws).
116. See id. at 1534-48. "[Ilncreases in the consumer bankruptcy filing rate
have . . . been driven by the easy availability and aggressive marketing of (often
quite expensive) consumer credit." Id. at 1585.
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seek to achieve those fixed preferences to the maximum extent
possible, 117 behavioral science teaches us that the situation faced
by a consumer can determine preferences and choices as much as,
or more than, prior preferences.11s One simple illustration is that
in making choices, the default choice can often determine the
outcome: consumers will make a different choice, i.e., have
different "preferences," depending on which choice is presented as
the status quo or default option. 119 For example, both New Jersey
and Pennsylvania introduced an option for auto insurance
consumers to limit their right to sue, in return for lower insurance
premiums.120 However, the default option in Pennsylvania was to
retain the full right to sue, while in New Jersey the default option
was the limited right to sue. 121 While 20% of New Jersey drivers
opted for the full right to sue, 75% of Pennsylvania drivers did
nothing and thereby "opted" for the full right to sue. 122 Similarly,
consumers are more likely to establish bank accounts if employers
offer the option of to be paid via direct deposit, as compared to
consumers who can only be paid in cash. 123
The South African microcredit experiment provides
interesting empirical data on the importance of situational and
psychological factors in consumer credit decisions. 124 The lender
conducting the experiment agreed to offer microloans (averaging
$150 for four months) to past customers, randomizing the interest
rates in the written offer. 125 Those customers who accepted a loan
were assigned randomized interest rates as well, i.e., not
necessarily the rate specified in the mailed offer. 126  The
117. See supra Part I.A.
118. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 4, at 766 (identifying situational factors which
affect choice).
119. See Korobkin, supra note 15, at 137 (discussing the "status quo bias" that
makes it difficult to determine if parties accept defaults because they are most
efficient).
120. See Marianne Betrand, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral
Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MARKETING 8, 11 (2006).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. This practice particularly impacts the poor, who are less likely to have the
option of direct deposit, the end result of which is a tendency to pay high fees for
after-hours check cashing. Id.
124. See Marianne Bertrand, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir
& Jonathan Zinman, What's Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the
Consumer Credit Market (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 918,
July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=770389.
125. Id. at 7-8.
126. Id. at n.17.
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experiment had several aims. The economists involved sought
evidence of behavior consistent with rational choice theory, in
particular adverse selection and moral hazard. 127 In addition, the
lender introduced a number of other variables seeking to identify
behavioral factors that would increase consumers' desire to accept
the offered loans. 128 Not surprisingly, the offered interest rate
significantly affected the rate at which consumers elected to take
the loans ("take-up rate").1 29  More surprisingly, at least to
traditional economists, the psychological manipulations affected
consumer choices as much as, or more than, simple economic
incentives. 13° The average psychological manipulation increased
the loan take-up rate as much as a 0.5% per month reduction in
the interest rate. 131
Two striking examples illustrate the effect of psychological
factors on consumer choice. First, behavioral scientists have found
that decisional conflict can have a paralyzing effect on
consumers. 132  When too many options are presented, the
individual will postpone a decision, or elect the status quo, despite
the availability of an alternative option on the menu that would
improve the individual's welfare or fulfill her preferences. 133 In
the South African experiment, some loan offers presented a single
choice of loan terms, while other offers presented four different
127. Id. at 5. Adverse selection is the result of consumers having exclusive
knowledge of aspects of their own risk of default, so that consumers with a higher
probability of default will accept higher interest rates. See Lawrence M. Ausubel,
Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
249, 262 (1997) (explaining that riskier borrowers know they do not have
alternatives that are less expensive than credit cards). A lender offering the higher
rate products will attract a disproportionate number of these secretly riskier
borrowers. See id. Moral hazard is the consumer's endemic preference for
defaulting on a contract given the economic incentives presented to her. See Joseph
E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 401 (1981) (illustrating that a higher interest
rate will encourage borrowers to choose the riskier of two alternative projects or
behaviors). The evidence for either adverse selection or moral hazard was rather
weak, while the impact of some of the psychological manipulations was substantial.
See Bertrand et al., supra note 124, at 4-5, 17-19; Dean S. Karlan & Jonathan
Zinman, Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a
Consumer Credit Field Experiment 6, 27-29 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr.,
Discussion Paper No. 911, May 2005), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=725563.
128. Bertrand et al., supra note 124, at 3-5.
129. Id. at 16-17.
130. See id. at 4-5, 23.
131. Id. at 2, 5.
132. See id. at 9.
133. See id. at 9-10 (citing Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky,
Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993)).
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combinations of rates and payments. 3 4 Reducing the choices to a
single offer had the same effect on acceptance of the offer as
reducing the interest rate by 2.3% per month.' 35 Second, and even
more intriguingly, the inclusion of a photograph of an attractive
female rather than a photo of a male increased take-up by male
consumers by as much as would a 4.5% reduction in interest
rate. 136 The impact of these manipulations was consistent across
income and educational level,' 37 belying the notion that the poor
and undereducated are more susceptible to emotional
manipulation by sellers.
2. Overconfidence and Risk
Credit and insurance products require consumers to evaluate
not only the price and immediate benefits obtained, but also the
risks of uncertain future events. In this area, individuals'
predictions are clearly biased and inaccurate.' 38 Oren Bar-Gill
offers consumers' use of credit cards as a clear example. 139
Consumers systematically overestimate their ability to repay their
credit card balances, and underestimate their future borrowing. 140
As a result, they choose pricing structures as if they will borrow
modest amounts and pay their monthly bills in full, or at least on
time.' 4' The credit card industry's pricing, with low annual fees
and high interest rates, as well as significant revenues generated
from late fees and other default-related charges, exploits
consumers' overconfidence in their borrowing and payment habits
in a systematic way.142 Bar-Gill describes this practice as
inefficient, and possibly exploitive. 143 A similar overconfidence
134. Id.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 26.
138. See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
139. See Bar-Gill, supra note 4.
140. See id. at 1375-76, 1395-1400.
141. See id. at 1401-08 (explaining that the most common pricing structures
used by credit card issuers appeal to consumers in the short-term since consumers
underestimate their risk of accruing debt in the long-term).
142. See id. at 1388-95.
143. See id. at 1411-16. But see Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and
Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 470, 475-82 (2007). Wright relies on industry-sponsored
research to contend that behavioral theories are not sufficiently predictive of credit
card consumers' choices, because a majority of credit card consumers are observed
to make the "rational" (i.e., wealth-maximizing) choice based on the given data. See
id. On the other hand, he concedes that based on the evidence, consumer behavior
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with regard to default risk clearly causes homeowners to take on
mortgages with risks of foreclosure that do not maximize their
long-term welfare. 144
The problem of consumers' overconfidence is related to the
problem of impulse control and conflicting preferences. A
consumer can have a long-run preference to keep her debt
manageable by paying off credit card balances in full each month,
but at the same time prefer in the short-run to make purchases
without regard to her eventual ability to pay the resulting bills. If,
not surprisingly, the purveyors of credit cater to the consumers'
short-run "preference," can it truly be said that the consumers'
long-run preferences and the consumers' welfare are thus well-
served?
3. Selective Judgment and Saliency
Consumer choices are made based on a limited number of
salient product features. 145  Consumers typically consider a
maximum of five product features. 146 For example, a consumer
shopping for a credit card may consider the annual fee, the
interest rate, and a rebate or bonus program offering, such as
frequent flyer miles. Credit card provisions regarding remote
contingencies, such as what happens if the consumer defaults in
payments, or has a dispute requiring litigation, are not salient to
consumers. 147 This is both because of the practical limit to the
number of features that she can consider, 148 and because of the
"availability heuristic," meaning that consumers discount risks
that are not easily imagined or connected to a recent personal or
is neither 100% rational nor 100% irrational. See id. at 509-10. Wright contends
that behavioral economists "assume consistent irrationality," and thereby set up a
straw man. See id. at n.31. Rather than asserting that consumer behavior is
always and predictably non-utilitarian, as Wright implies of behavioralists,
behavioral economics is better understood as saying that consumer behavior is not
entirely predictable by rational choice theory. What behavioralism loses in
predictive certainty, it gains in descriptive depth.
144. See McCoy, supra note 4, at 736 (describing homeowners' tendency to
overestimate their ability to make all their mortgage payments far into the future
based on their ability to make the first payment).
145. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206, 1225-34 (2003).
146. See id. at 1227-29 (describing research involving the number of product
attributes that consumers consider in making decisions).
147. See id. at 1225-34 (asserting that in a transaction involving a form contract
it is unlikely that the consumer will consider the boiler-plate terms of the form
contract to be salient).
148. See id. at 1226-29, 1291.
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familiar experience. 149 Therefore consumers will not generally
consider terms such as default interest rate increases or
arbitration clauses, and sellers have no reason to offer good
versions of these terms.150 Thus, non-salient contract terms are
not likely to be optimized through unregulated market
processes. 151
Although not articulated in this fashion, the saliency concept
has gained some recognition in the law. One example in the law of
credit cards is the provision for the consumer's potential liability
for charges made by a thief who steals the consumer's card. The
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) caps this liability at $50.152 Prior to
TILA mandating this contract term, card issuers made varying
provisions regarding default for unauthorized charges, usually
much less favorable to card holders. 153 When these contractual
provisions were left to the free market, the terms developed by
sellers were aptly characterized as private legislation, rather than
reflecting any consumer choices. 154
The FTC gathered extensive empirical support for the
inefficiency of nonsalient terms when it studied, and eventually
banned, a variety of onerous merchant remedies in the Credit
Practices Rule. 155 The FTC found that provisions for draconian
remedies after default, such as assigning consumer wages to the
creditor or advance agreement to waiver of exemptions or trial,
were not considered by, or bargained for, by consumers. 156
Recently, the Federal Reserve Board conducted extensive
consumer focus group testing to redesign the TILA disclosures for
credit cards and other open-end credit products. 157 The results
with respect to balance computation methods illustrate the
saliency problem. Credit card issuers use a variety of different
149. See id. at 1232-33.
150. See id. at 1234-39.
151. See id. at 1243-44.
152. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1643(a)(1)(B) (2000).
153. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 14, at 1069-71, 1073-34 (explaining credit
card issuers' typical practice of allocating the risk of a lost or stolen credit card to
the consumer until the issuer received notification of the loss).
154. See id. at 1051-52.
155. See Credit Practices Rule; Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory
Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740 (Mar. 1, 1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 444).
156. See id. at 7743-44.
157. See Macro Int'l, Inc., Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending




methods to calculate the monthly interest charges.15 8  Not
surprisingly, many issuers have resorted to counterintuitive
methods that increase the interest based on a given transaction
history. 159 The Federal Reserve attempted to provide explanations
of these balance computation methods using various formats and
language. 160 None of the attempts were successful; consumers
invariably reported that they would disregard this information if it
were included in credit card materials. 161
Nevertheless, United States legal culture continues, for the
most part, to ignore the saliency problem. A comparison of the
United States and European approaches to the privacy of
consumer information gathered by merchants illustrates the point.
The provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) allow
financial institutions to establish any level of information privacy
that they choose, so long as the privacy regime is disclosed to
consumers, who are presumed to "shop" for contracts based on the
competing privacy policies. 162 Significant amounts of evidence
suggest that when consumers shop for various financial products,
they will consider key price terms, and perhaps benefits like
frequent flier miles awards with credit cards, but rarely if ever will
the issuer's privacy policy rise to the level of a salient contract
term. 1 63  The GLB construct is a classic example of the
mythologizing power of rational choice theory. The European
Union's approach, on the other hand, is to establish reasonable
default rules for the privacy of consumer information, 164 thus
recognizing that the consumer's preference for privacy is unlikely
158. See id. at v.
159. See id. at v-vi (explaining the researchers' attempts to include a useful
description of one of the more complicated balance calculation methods called "two-
cycle" billing that has the potential for higher interest charges, and their finding
that a brief explanation was not sufficient to achieve consumer understanding of
the method).
160. Id. at v-vi, 27, 31, 34, 39-40.
161. See id. at v-vi, 14, 23, 31, 34, 39-40.
162. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000).
163. See, e.g., MARY J. CULNAN, THE CULNAN-MILNE SURVEY ON CONSUMERS &
ONLINE PRIVACY NOTICES: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 6 (Dec. 2001),
http://intra.som.umass.edulgeorgemilne/pdfLfiles/culnan-milne.pdf
(providing survey data indicating that many consumers rarely read the privacy
notices that accompany credit card statements); Korobkin, supra note 145, at 1225-
34 (presenting evidence that form contract terms are not among the limited
number of salient terms that consumers take into consideration when making
decisions).
164. See Council Directive 95/46, The Protection of Individuals with Regard to




to be expressed through a market for standardized forms.
4. Mental Shortcuts Affect the Poor Especially-Less
Margin for Error
Of particular concern to any theory of justice that gives
special consideration to the welfare of the least well-off is the fact
that the poor are more likely to be harmed by both their own
imperfect decision making and by marketing efforts of sellers that
exploit knowledge of consumer behavioral biases. 165 This is not
because the biases of the poor are more inaccurate than anyone
else's. It is a result of the fact that suboptimal decisions have
much greater consequences for the poor. 166 For example, defaults
and channel factors often prevent the poor from participating in
the financial mainstream, and instead leave them in the fringe
banking sector, paying higher fees for less comprehensive banking
services. 167
B. Seller Behavior: Obfuscation, Exploitation, and the
Agency Problem
Sellers understand very well the extent of consumers'
bounded rationality, although they may not describe it in that
way. Billions are spent every year on behavioral research by the
marketing industry in order to understand consumer biases and
heuristics. 168 Armed with this information, marketers engage in
various strategies to increase sales by exploiting consumer search
costs, obfuscation, identity group marketing, focusing on salient
features, identifying with consumers' subjective goals, and other
strategies. 169  Seller obfuscation also exploits framing effects,
consumer biases, and creates or exacerbates information
problems. 170  The examples discussed below illustrate the
165. See Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 120, at 8. For an example
of a theory of justice that focuses on the welfare of the least-advantaged members
of society, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
166. See Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 120, at 8.
167. See id. at 11-13.
168. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1429 (1999).
169. See, e.g., Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and
Price Elasticities on the Internet (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10570, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10570 (examining the
ways in which Internet retailers use obfuscation to hinder consumers' attempts to
perform simple price comparisons); Korobkin, supra note 145, at 1234 ("[N]on-
salient attributes are subject to inefficiencies driven by the strategic behavior of
sellers attempting to increase their profits at the expense of unknowing buyers.").
170. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1375-77, 1388-95 (describing the
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possibilities for such seller exploitation.
Payday loans, for example, are described (falsely) as a short-
term credit product, exploiting the consumer's optimism bias that
predicts an ability to pay the loan in full at the next payday, and
discounts the inevitable recurrence of the cash shortage that
prompted the loan. 171 "Framing," which consists of altering a
consumer's preferences by defining the menu from which choices
are made, 172 is also used by payday lenders. Payday lenders
compare the extremely high Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of a
payday loan to the cost of bank overdraft fees if the payday loan is
not used (avoiding a loss) rather than, say, the much cheaper
alternative of a cash advance on a credit card.
Similarly, a mortgage product that provides for monthly
payments of less than the accrued interest, resulting in negative
amortization, is sold as a "payment option ARM"' mortgage.1 73 The
"option" referred to is the consumer's option to pay a larger
monthly payment in order to cover the interest, or an even larger
payment that will amortize the loan. 74 Of course, these loans are
sold based on the initial, negatively amortizing payment, and often
borrowers can only afford the lowest payment choice, so that the
"option" for marginal borrowers is illusory. 175 Calling these loans
"escalating balance" loans or "your payments will go up rapidly"
loans would be another way to frame the choice.
While information asymmetries are understood and
incorporated in some traditional neoclassical economic models, 176 a
optimism bias and the ways in which lenders exploit it to convince consumers to
enter into credit card agreements that are not beneficial to them); McCoy, supra
note 4, at 729-35 (explaining ways in which predatory lenders frame situations to
manipulate loss-averse consumers).
171. See lain Ramsay, Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Keynote Address at Australian Credit at the Crossroads: Consumer Credit
Regulation as "The Third Way"? 6-12 (Nov. 8-9, 2004), available at
http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154[Lookup/CAV_-SeminarsConfer
encesNationalCredit_2004_November/$file/ramsay.pdf (discussing the limits to
consumer rationality, such as optimism bias, and the ways in which payday and
other lenders exploit these limitations).
172. See McCoy, supra note 4, at 729-32.
173. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages, 71 Fed. Reg.
58,609, 58,609, 58,613 (Oct. 4, 2006).
174. See id. at 58,609.
175. See id. at 58,613-14, 58,616 (warning lenders that offering initial rates that
are too low increases the risk of "payment shock," in which consumers who only
make minimum payments struggle when those payments increase, and requesting
lenders to warn borrowers of such risks).
176. See, e.g., Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 127 (examining the ways in which
banks' lack of information regarding the riskiness of borrowers leads to excess
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behavioral approach recognizes that consumers' misunderstanding
of contract information is not just a function of poor disclosure and
literacy. Consumers' understanding of contract terms is also
affected by systematic biases, and by seller strategies to create and
exploit information asymmetry. 177 The information asymmetry
that favors sellers of complex financial products is not a mere
accident, to be fixed with either mandates for disclosures to
consumers or generalized efforts to enhance the financial literacy
of the populace. The deeper asymmetry lies in the gulf between
the complexity of modern consumer contracts on the one hand,
with their fragmented and contingent pricing schemes, deceptive
penalty systems, and one-sided remedies, and, on the other hand,
the limited ability of the average American to read and use
documents and make difficult computations involving compound
interest and the like. 178 Put another way, price and product
complexity are effective obfuscation strategies that sellers can use
to rationally maximize profits. The information problem is not an
accident; it is the result of predictable market behaviors. This
aspect of market functioning does not maximize consumer welfare,
as conceived by neoclassical economics.
In his thorough discussion, Oren Bar-Gill points out the ways
in which the credit card industry has exploited consumer biases
and self-control problems in designing price structures (annual
fees, default-related fees, and so forth) to prices well above
marginal cost.' 79 The evidence that rational choice theory is not
descriptive of the operation of the real world credit card market is
plain and robust, as is the evidence that A) behavioral phenomena
described based on experiments in the lab find their expression in
real behavior in real consumer markets, 180 and B) credit card
issuers are systematically able to exploit consumer biases and
behaviors. 181
While sellers exploit their superior knowledge of behavioral
tendencies of consumers, sellers also have their own behavioral
problems. Among these are the differences between the
motivation of individual retail sales representatives and brokers
demand in credit markets).
177. See sources cited supra note 170.
178. See White & Mansfield, supra note 31.
179. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1388-95.
180. See, e.g., Bertrand et al., supra note 124, at 3 (asserting that their study
illustrates consumer behaviors that previously had only been documented in lab
experiments in a real market setting).
181. See sources cited supra note 170.
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on the one hand, and the wholesale sellers or lenders on the
other. 18 2 This is the famous agency problem. 18 3 Predatory lending
has been attributed, at least in part, to the behavior of brokers and
intermediaries, who may cause excessively risky credit products to
be sold in order to maximize their compensation, and who may be
guided by their own biases in steering consumers. 18 4 For example,
they may assume that members of racial minorities are less
concerned with price and more concerned with credit approval and
convenience.185 The agency problem and broker biases mean that
the forces on both sides of consumer market transactions can
result in consumer harm.
C. The Magnitude of Bounded Rationality and Seller
Exploitation in the Real World: Some Examples
1. Payday Lending
As a result of the deregulation of interest rates at the state
and federal levels, the payday loan, a small short-term advance
made at triple-digit interest rates, has mushroomed into a major
industry in the past fifteen years.18 6 The essence of the payday
loan product is a deception. Viewed as a payment of, for example,
$45 in order to borrow $500 for two weeks, such a loan could be
seen as a rational alternative for a consumer in certain limited
scenarios (such as an emergency non-recurring expense or
adequate projected cash flow in the coming pay periods). The
lenders know, however, that 90% of payday loans are made to
consumers who are not able to repay in the short-term, and
instead are forced to "roll over" their loans for months or even
years.187 After five to seven loan renewals the interest begins to.
exceed the principal, and it is very difficult to argue that such a
transaction has increased a consumer's welfare, even compared to
182. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and
Predatory Lending: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More than They Can Chew?,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 544 (2007).
183. See id. at 544-45.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV.
855, 855 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory
Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 110, 111 (2008).
187. See URIAH KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT




onerous alternatives such as paying overdraft or late fees. 188
The consumer who gets a payday loan is making a completely
mistaken, but easily understandable, calculation. She assumes
that $15 or $20 per $100 is a small price to pay to meet an
immediate expense, discounts the possibility that the same cash
shortfall will confront her when the loan becomes due, and
believes that she has one of the 10% of loans that do not lead to
repeated borrowing. This miscalculation results from the
overconfidence bias, and perhaps inappropriate discount rates for
the time value of money, but is also actively encouraged by seller
obfuscation. The payday lenders, even by naming their product,
actively seek to encourage the consumer's mistaken idea that the
loan is very short-term and low-cost (i.e., it is a loan "just until
payday").
The payday loan also exploits consumers' tendency to create
separate mental accounts. One payday borrower, when questioned
in a deposition as to why she got a payday loan instead of using a
credit card or accepting a new credit card offer, responded that a
credit card represented a possibility of accumulating long-term
debt that she would never repay, whereas the direct deposit
repayment system of the payday loan, in her mind at least,
precluded runaway debt.18 9 She even acknowledged this as a
deliberate device to protect herself against her own self-control
problems, just as a dieter might place a lock on the refrigerator. 190
Viewed in the aggregate from a policy standpoint, it is true
that a portion, perhaps a third, of the individual consumers who
interact with a payday lender use the loan as a truly short-term
credit product and are not harmed (and perhaps even
benefited). 191  Evaluating the product on a cost-benefit basis,
however, requires balancing this arguable welfare benefit with the
clear harm that results from the combination of consumer
overconfidence and seller obfuscation and exploitation, leading
two-thirds of consumers stuck in a debt trap, adding interest
payments to their chronic cash flow deficit. 192 If we were to
consider a consumer who is unable to repay a payday loan in a
188. See id. at 4.
189. Deposition of L. Davis at 76, Turner v. Frascella Enterprises Adv., No. 06-
101 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
190. Id.
191. See KING ET AL., supra note 187, at 14 app. I (demonstrating that 37% of
consumers, accounting for about 10% of loans, took out fewer than 5 payday loans




reasonable time as a product failure, the payday loan product
could be regarded as having a 60% (by number of consumers) or
90% (by number of loans) failure rate. This is an outcome that
would not be tolerated in the case of tangible goods causing
physical injuries to consumers.
Thus, even within the utilitarian framework of cost-benefit
analysis and aggregation of consumer welfare, the case for
banning payday loans, or at least restricting them to their
purported intent by limiting repeat borrowing, is compelling.
Nevertheless, the mythology of consumer autonomy retains its
powerful hold, and commentators continue to caution against
excessive regulatory intervention in the face of this obvious
exploitation and harm. 193
2. Price Discrimination, the Auto Market and Auto
Financing, and the Black Tax
The deregulation of credit terms has been touted as
benefiting previously excluded consumers through the wonders of
risk-based pricing. 194 Risk-based pricing refers to the charging of
interest rates and fees at a higher rate to consumers perceived as
presenting a higher risk (and ultimately, cost) of nonpayment to
the lender. 195 Usury laws limiting interest rates are said to
prevent risk-based pricing and force creditors to simply deny credit
to all but the most creditworthy. 1
96
Whether the lifting of interest rate ceilings has resulted in
the efficient assignment of higher rates to riskier consumer
borrowers is not at all clear. 197 What is clear, however, is that in
the past decade or so, African-American consumers have
systematically paid significantly higher interest rates and fees for
both mortgage and automobile credit than their White
counterparts. 198 It is equally clear that these higher rates and fees
193. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 186, at 855.
194. Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research,
15 HOUSING POLY DEBATE 503, 503 (2004), available at
http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd%2015(3)fhpd%2015(3)-article-white.pdf.
195. Id. at 504.
196. See Richard Hynes & Eric Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer
Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 180-81 (2002).
197. See generally White, supra note 194, at 505 (discussing the principles of the
efficiency rationale and providing empirical research to assess its effect).
198. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON




are not directly traceable to higher costs of making loans to
minority consumers because of credit risk or any other factor. 199
Auto credit price discrimination has been the subject of
several successful class actions. 200 The evidence in these cases
was particularly straightforward and compelling. Auto loans are
commonly sold by auto dealers, who act as agents or brokers for
the auto finance lenders such as General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC).201 The lender determines an interest rate
that it will offer to the consumer, based presumably on objective
credit criteria, and informs the dealer. 202 The dealer then adds a
markup to the par interest rate offered by the finance company
and receives a payment from the finance company in return. 203
Prior to the recent litigation, the finance companies allowed the
dealers complete discretion in determining the markups. 204 The
experts retained by the plaintiffs in these suits found consistently
that the dealer markups were significantly higher for African-
American auto buyers than for Whites. 205 Given that the credit
risk and other factors were fully reflected in the par rate set by the
finance company, it is difficult to see any nonracial explanation for
the differential in the dealer markups. 206
Racial disparities in the price of credit are also apparent in
the subprime mortgage market.20 7 As a result of changes to the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), lenders now report
annually the APR for mortgages priced above a certain threshold,
Calem, Jonathan E. Hershaff & Susan M. Wachter, Neighborhood Patterns of
Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate Cities, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 603
(2004), available at
http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd%2015(3)/hpd%2015(3)-article calem.pdf;
see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in
Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 312-314, 319 (1995) (reporting
survey data showing that auto dealers systematically initiate negotiations for the
cash price of autos at higher prices for minority shoppers).
199. GRUNSTEIN BoCIAN ET AL., supra note 198, at 3.
200. See generally Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Examples of NCLC's Litigation,
http://www.nclc.org/issues/cocounseling/examples-litigation.shtml#auto (last
visited Oct. 3, 2008) (providing examples of auto credit pricing discrimination class
action settlement agreements).




205. See Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315, 319-20
(M.D. Tenn. 2000), rev'd in part, 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002).
206. See id. at 320-21.
207. See GRUNSTEIN BOCIAN ETAL., supra note 198, at 3-4.
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along with demographic and loan data. 208 These HMDA reports
have been studied carefully by various scholars. 20 9  Despite
controlling for credit scores, home values, and other objective
criteria, the racial disparities in pricing persist, with minority
homeowners paying significantly higher interest rates for
mortgage loans than their White counterparts. 210
To the neoclassical economist, race discrimination in pricing
in this form makes no sense. If some sellers of credit are charging
higher rates and prices to minority consumers than their risks
warrant, other sellers should see the profit opportunity in offering
lower rates and prices to the victims of race discrimination.
Eventually the sellers charging higher prices would be either
driven to lower their prices or forced out of the market. 211 The
real world data, however, do not conform to this theoretical
model. 21 2 Instead, they suggest a complex set of behaviors by
consumers and sellers that result in troubling inequities in the
unregulated market. 21 3
Although the persistence of race-based pricing is well
established empirically, the behavioral reasons for it are less well
understood. In its analysis of mortgage price data, the Federal
Reserve Board's staff points to the fact that controlling for the
identity of the seller significantly reduces the observed racial price
disparities. 214 A number of researchers have suggested that the
retail channels for the sale of mortgages, especially subprime
mortgages, are segmented in ways that segregate minority
homeowners into higher-cost loans. 215  African-American
consumers in particular are more likely to obtain mortgage loans
via brokers and less well-regulated outlets, while White borrowers
208. Id. at 6-9.
209. See id. at 8-9.
210. See id. at 3-4; see also Calem, et al., supra note 198, at 605.
211. Cf. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION, 39-49 (2d ed.
1971) (demonstrating how employers' subjective tastes generate discrimination in
the labor market); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination
Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1989) (discussing the economic effects of sex
discrimination in the workplace).
212. See Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, Higher-
Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED. RES. BULL. A123, A162
(2006).
213. See id.
214. See id. at A158-A159.
215. See WILLIAM APGAR, AMAL BENDIMERAD & REN S. ESSENE, HARVARD JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUs. STUDIES, MORTGAGE MARKET CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN




are more likely to borrow from regulated depository institutions,
such as banks. 2 16 These data suggest a market in which some
sellers compete on price, while others appeal to the consumer's
desire for easy credit approval, use affinity group marketing, and
use other behavioral techniques to avoid price competition. 217 The
perception on the part of retail lenders that minority consumers
are more anxious about credit approval than price, and that they
pose worse credit risks than objective data would suggest, together
with the various perceptions minority consumers may have about
mainstream lending institutions, combine to produce racially
discriminatory pricing both within and among lenders. 218 This
disturbing and persistent presence of race discrimination in credit
pricing is another example of an unregulated market being neither
efficient nor fair.
3. Prepayment Penalties in Subprime Mortgages
From 1995 to 2005 the subprime mortgage market exploded
in the U.S., growing to roughly 20% of new mortgage originations
in 2006.219 Subprime mortgages are typically priced at interest
rates 2% to 6% higher than conventional and Federal Housing
Administration residential mortgages. 220 In addition to the higher
rates, subprime mortgages are sold with various other complex
price terms that distinguish them from conventional mortgages. 221
One such price term is the prepayment penalty. 222 Typically, a
subprime mortgage will provide that if the consumer pays more
than 20% of the principal prior to the maturity date, a penalty
equal to 6 months' interest, 4% to 6% at today's rates, is
216. See id. at 27; REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, HARVARD JOINT CTR. FOR
Hous. STUDIES, UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD
MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 28 (2007), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu
publications/finance/mm07- 1_mortgage-market behavior.pdf.
217. See ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 216, at 25-31 (citing a variety of mortgage
marketing practices designed to appeal to consumer emotions and biases rather
than to compete on price and quality); see also UNITED COMPANIES LENDING CORP.,
ORIGINATOR ORIENTATION MANUAL 36 (1998) (instructing its employees that their
customers are "not interest rate sensitive").
218. See Avery et al., supra note 212, at A162.
219. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home
Foreclosures: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th
Congress 5 (2007) (statement of Douglas Duncan, Senior Vice President of
Research and Business Development, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n), available at
http://mortgagebankers.org/files/News/InternalResource/48292Testimony.pdf.
220. See White, supra note 194, at 517-519.




assessed. 223 In 2001, approximately 80% of subprime mortgages
were sold with prepayment penalties. 224 In contrast, fewer than
3% of prime, conventional mortgages were sold with prepayment
penalties.225
Rational choice theory would posit that consumers are
"choosing' prepayment penalties in the subprime market because
they somehow maximize expected utility. The penalty is only paid
in the event that the early prepayment occurs. Therefore, if the
consumer receives any benefit, such as a lower interest rate or
other savings, the penalty is a rational choice for a consumer who
reasonably projects that he will not prepay in the penalty period.
An economist might propose the following equation:
Prepayment Penalty = 1 if Ai > P$ x t(P)
In the above equation, Ai is the present value of the interest rate
savings offered in return for the penalty, P$ is the present value of
the prepayment penalty, and a(P) is the probability of incurring
the penalty.
Subprime mortgages have in fact experienced frequent
prepayments, despite the presence of penalties. 226 Something like
50% of subprime mortgages are prepaid in the first 3 years, and
60% or more of those mortgages feature penalties, so that
something like 33% of consumers "choosing' loans with penalties
end up paying the penalty. 227 These consumers obviously have
made the wrong forecast of their own behavior.
The prevalence of prepayment penalties in the subprime
market is more easily explained from the perspective of behavioral
economics. Information problems certainly play a role, 228 but





227. See Michael D. Calhoun, President, Ctr. For Responsible Lending, Are
Legislative Remedies to Limit Predatory Lending Really Remedies?, Address at the
Federal Reserve Community Affairs Research Conference 5 (Mar. 29, 2007)
(transcript on file with author), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/remarks-of-michael-calhoun-crl-03-29-
2007.pdf.
228. See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS, ES-7 (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (finding that
two-thirds of consumers surveyed could not determine from disclosure forms that




that allow sellers to sell products with harmful prepayment
penalties to subprime borrowers. Overconfidence bias causes
consumers to discount the possibility that they will incur the
penalty. Saliency means that consumers will focus on more
immediate price features, such as the interest rate and the
monthly payment, and pay less attention to the prepayment
penalty, which is a contingent and future price component. To the
extent that the monthly payment itself serves as the proxy for the
loan's total cost, the prepayment penalty does not enter into the
consumer's calculation at all.
The incidence of incorrectly chosen prepayment penalties is
troubling not only because of the direct cost to subprime borrowers
of paying the penalties, but also because of two additional
consumer welfare harms. Prepayment penalties significantly
increase the risk of foreclosure, 229 and fall disproportionately on
African-American and Latino consumers. 230
In each of these examples, the degree to which consumer
markets deviate from rational choice theory is substantial. In
each case, market outcomes are neither efficient nor equitable.
The deregulation of consumer credit markets in the name of
efficiency has led to a variety of other harms to consumers,
including overindebtedness, 231 and resulting harms to debtors'
health and well-being. 232 In each case, consumer well-being could
have been considerably improved with thoughtful restraints on
credit offerings in the marketplace.
III. The Normative Conclusions to be Drawn from the
Insights of Behavioral Economics
A. The Normative Conundrum
Rational choice theory suffers from twin problems: it does not
describe the real world accurately, and the efficiency norm it
229. See ROBERTO QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF N. C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT
OF PREDATORY LOAN TERMS ON SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES: THE SPECIAL CASE OF
PREPAYMENT PENALTIES AND BALLOON PAYMENTS 1 (2005),
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/foreclosurepaper.pdf.
230. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN & RICHARD ZHEI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, BORROWERS IN HIGHER MINORITY AREAS MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE
PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON SUBPRIME LOANS 1 (2005),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr004-PPP Minority-Neighborhoods-
0105.pdf.
231. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 4, at 1525.
232. Elizabeth Warren, The Vanishing Middle Class, in ENDING POVERTY IN
AMERICA: HOW TO RESTORE THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2007).
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imposes excludes consideration of essential concepts of justice.
The shortcomings of rational choice theory as a description of real
markets call into question its normative underpinnings. For one
thing, the behavioral evidence shows that the values of consumer
autonomy and utilitarian welfare maximization do not align
neatly. 233 Because of consumers' biases and mental shortcuts, and
their exploitation by sellers, deregulation of markets does not
maximize consumer welfare. 234 Forced to choose, many legal
economists abandon, or at least compromise, the autonomy norm
to continue the pursuit of welfare maximization, redefined, via
"soft paternalism." 235  Moreover, efficiency and wealth
maximization have well-understood defects as norms, particularly
if they are to be the sole normative values in a "monistic" value
system.236 Not the least of these problems is the wealth effect, i.e.,
the fact that in conventional law and economics, the preferences of
the rich count for more than those of the poor. 237  A richer
approach to consumer contract law would abandon the monistic
value system built around utilitarian wealth maximization. In its
place, lawmakers and judges need to acknowledge the inevitable,
and necessarily indeterminate, competition among values of
autonomy, efficiency, welfare maximization, and equity.
Many of the legal economists who are incorporating
behavioral research into their work cling to the normative project
233. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 168, at 1425.
234. See id.
235. See sources cited infra notes 238, 241.
236. For one of the most cited critiques of monistic theories of value, see
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 117-40, 163-67 (1993).
David A. Hoffman and Michael P. O'Shea summarize the debate concerning
efficiency, wealth maximization, and other versions of marketplace. Hoffman &
O'Shea, supra note 38, at 347-51; see also Lind, supra note 45, at 318 (discussing
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in the context of tort compensation).
237. Because economists use willingness to pay, as revealed through market
prices, as a proxy for the well-being of consumers, the leap from maximizing
welfare (a plausible goal) to maximizing wealth requires disregarding the fact that
in the real world, consumers have widely varying wealth and income and, as a
result, ability to express their preferences in the market. See Hynes & Posner,
supra note 196, at 180-82 (examining the positives and negatives of consumer
finance laws). In other words, wealth maximization is a form of utilitarianism in
which the preferences of the wealthy count for more in the social welfare function.
Id. This unequally-weighted utilitarianism has obvious moral shortcomings, in any
value system that requires that every individual be treated with equal dignity and
respect. Id. While some law and economics scholars take the wealth effect
seriously and advance some theoretical ideas about offsetting adjustments in
making law and policy, these adjustments also require moving away from the
autonomy of the free market to an oligarchy of enlightened bureaucrats, who are
called upon to make some rather difficult utilitarian calculations. Id.
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of law and economics, and seek to fix the defects that prevent
people from acting as the rational utility maximizers that they
"should" be. 238 For example, to solve the situation problems, some
propose to extend periods of reflection and rights to rescind,
remove the emotional burden of the contracting situation, prevent
the consumer from employing abbreviated reasoning and being
invested in an unwise decision before evaluating all the
information, and force the consumer to, hopefully, stop using so
many mental shortcuts and be "rational."239 To solve the problem
of information overload and complex products and services with
many non-salient terms that consumers ignore, some propose that
courts should enforce these non-salient terms if they are
"efficient," i.e., if the theoretical rational consumer would, acting
as a rational chooser, have negotiated them. 240 These solutions
are sometimes described as "soft paternalism."' 241
Most legal economists, when confronted with the behavioral
evidence that unregulated markets will not achieve wealth
maximization, simply propose achieving maximization by other
means, such as having judges or regulatory agencies attempt to
mimic the efficient operation of the theoretical market. 242 This
means, of course, that to pursue utilitarian goals, the autonomy
value, previously thought to be so neatly aligned with utility
maximization, is set aside. 243 The evidence of real world behavior
also makes the utilitarian task much more difficult, as we wrestle
238. Ronald Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 910 (2006)
("The key question is whether consumers on the ground are making choices with
sufficient care and rationality to drive the market to a competitive and optimal set
of products and prices."); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Richard Epstein, Consumer
Contracts: Behavioral Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics (Law and Economics
Research Paper Series, Working Paper 07-17, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982527 (presenting opposing behavioral and neoclassical
views of consumer contract law, but both agreeing that legal rules must be
designed to maximize aggregate consumer welfare, implicitly via wealth
maximization).
239. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 4, at 823-24.
240. See Korobkin, supra note 15, at 140.
241. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron
(Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 185, 2d
series, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=405940) (advocating "libertarian
paternalism").
242. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis when Preferences are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner
eds., 2001); Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 38, at 338-39.
243. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral




with how to measure consumer well-being, since the consumer's
own perception of well-being, as expressed through her market
choices, turns out to be an imperfect guide.
The desire to adjust the market processes that consumers
face to approximate the rational choice theory ideal leaves
unstated what the objective of contract and competition law should
be. The unstated normative premise is that law should remain
faithful to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency goal, 244 sacrificing to some
extent the autonomy goal in the process. The new insights of
behavioral economics reveal the difficulty of the project, but more
fundamentally, the question arises whether the project is
worthwhile in the first place. If rational choice theory does not
describe how consumers and markets behave, if real people in real
markets are subject to exploitation and harm and do not enter the
market with fixed preferences to begin with, if indeed their
preferences can be manipulated through framing, channel factors,
and other informed seller strategies, and if the law is unable to
fully empower or force consumers to behave as economists think
they should, should we not reconsider the normative goal of
consumer contract law?
While there may be merit to tinkering with consumer
decision processes and making them less vulnerable to
exploitation by sellers, the law also needs to take account of seller
exploitation directly, and to recognize that harmful consumer and
seller behavior is determined by far more than just information
and bias problems. I do not mean to suggest by this that efficiency
should be discarded as a goal of the law. The single-minded
pursuit of market efficiency need not be replaced with the single-
minded pursuit of other goals, such as consumer autonomy, equity,
or the prevention of exploitation. The trap into which orthodox
law and economics has fallen is the desire for a single, unifying
theory and lodestar by which all legal decisions can be measured.
The harmful effects of the single-minded pursuit of wealth
maximization via deregulation in real world consumer markets are
instructive. There will on many occasions be a dialectical tension
between and among various values, including efficiency,
autonomy, equity, and procedural justice. The point is to recognize
this problem, and be explicit about one's normative goals.
244. See Lind, supra note 45, at 318.
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B. Proposals to Fix the Market Failures-To What End?
To begin with, it is clear from the insights of behavioral
economics that efficiency and autonomy are not the same thing
and are not obviously served by maximum deregulation. 245 A new
conception of autonomy would mean offering consumers
meaningful, and therefore bounded choices, particularly in the
realms of complex financial consumer products like credit and
insurance. Consumers will consider only salient product terms,
will do so with imperfect information, and will make choices that
are heavily influenced both by their own biases and by situational
factors created by sellers, including the perceived default or status
quo option. 246
Contract terms involving risks and contingent events, such as
loan repayment, are particularly problematic. No amount of
information will necessarily overcome the optimism bias, the
saliency problem, and the availability heuristic, that is,
consumers' tendency to believe that negative outcomes will not
happen to them, or will happen only based on their available
knowledge of actual instances where risks have materialized. 247
Regulation of product safety has long recognized, at least
implicitly, that risks affecting consumers' health and physical
safety cannot be left to the free market, because of information
and behavioral problems, as well as external costs (i.e., harms to
third parties caused by consumers willing to buy dangerous
products from sellers).248
A variety of proposals can serve to illustrate how a pluralistic
value approach to consumer contract law might work. Risky
financial products, like subprime mortgage loans, could reasonably
be regulated. Certain excessively risky features could be
restricted to particular consumers or situations, or banned
altogether. Such limitations would not only maximize welfare, but
would also promote genuine rather than spurious consumer
autonomy. Elizabeth Warren has suggested creation of a
245. For example, the suggestion that enlightened regulators should prevent
consumers from making inefficient choices implies that autonomy must be
sacrificed to promote efficiency. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Boundedly Rational
Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 254 (2006).
246. See generally Sunstein, supra note 241, at 1195-99 (discussing the
rationality, or lack thereof, of consumers' choices).
247. See discussion supra Part II.
248. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8, 9 (2007)
("Consumers can enter the market to buy physical products confident that they




Financial Services Product Safety Commission, which would
regulate the safety of financial products marketed to consumers,
particularly credit cards. 249 Such a commission could concern
itself not only with measuring the welfare benefits and harms of
various products, and the channels by which they are sold to
consumers, but the equity effects as well, including the impact of
credit products on wealth accumulation and distribution. 250
Apart from concerns of autonomy, the law also must take
account of the exploitation of consumers in general and of the poor
and minority groups in particular. The payday lending example
offers a compelling instance of seller exploitation of consumer
information and behavior problems whose harmful effects fall
particularly hard on low-income working people. 251 The racial
disparities in auto and subprime credit pricing also offer persistent
and disturbing evidence that the unregulated market further
disadvantages the disadvantaged. 252
Prior proposals to rethink consumer law in light of behavioral
research tend to fall into four categories. The first category is
firmly grounded in rational choice theory. It consists of proposals
to attack the information and bias problems by giving consumers
better, more useful and timely disclosures. 253  Second are
proposals to regulate the contracting situation, for example with
periods of reflection. 254 Third are proposals to regulate contract
terms directly, as in the example of the Financial Services Product
Safety Commission idea. These proposals may retain the
efficiency goal, while recognizing the unregulated market's ability
to achieve it, or they may explicitly or implicitly promote other
values.255 Fourth are proposals to allow courts to refuse
enforcement of contracts, or modify their terms. 256  These
proposals also can be based on notions of efficiency, as in the case
of Professor Korobkin's suggestion that courts fix non-salient
terms to mimic the outcome of an imaginary efficient market.
257
But nonenforcement can also be grounded in recognition of the
249. Id. at 8.
250. See id.
251. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 186, at 884; Peterson, supra note 182, at
1126.
252. See GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 198; Ayres & Siegelman, supra
note 198, at 312-14, 319; Calem et al., supra note 198.
253. See infra notes 259-260and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 278-279 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
256. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
257. See Korobkin, supra note 15, at 137-42.
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competing demands of fairness, autonomy, and efficiency.
Included in the first, information-fixing category, are
proposals to simply increase disclosures. One example is Oren
Bar-Gill's proposal to debias credit card consumers by disclosing to
them the risks of credit overextension. 258  He suggests that
consumers be informed, presumably in the written disclosure
package they already receive, of the risk that the consumer may be
underestimating their future borrowing, using statistics of past
borrower behavior.259 The consumer could also receive individual
notice as their balance increases of the potential long-term
consequences. 260 While the intention may be laudable, research
shows that debiasing is very difficult, and that even when
consumers are told about their behavioral biases they may not
correct them substantially. 26 1 When impulse control is involved,
the disclosure may just be consumer abuse, telling them what they
already know, but are not able to prevent, as with warning labels
on high-calorie foods.262
Another information fix involves some substantive contract
regulation. If consumer choice is rendered less effective or
ineffective because of the complexity and multiplicity of product
features, then regulation should aim to reduce complexity. For
example, mortgage lenders could be forced to simplify their pricing
structures, putting all the cost of credit into an interest rate and a
single fee. 263 This has been the aim of mortgage reform proposals
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for
years. 264 A related information fix is to require sellers and lenders
to provide readily accessible price information via an information
clearinghouse on the internet, or a centralized bidding system.265
None of the information fixes, of course, will overcome the
selectivity and saliency problems.
The next category includes proposals which would make
regulatory improvements to the contracting situation. Among
258. See Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1378, 1417-20.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 1419.
261. See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1542.
262. See id.
263. Willis, supra note 4, at 821.
264. E.g., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, JOINT REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL
ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (1998),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf.
265. Willis, supra note 4, at 825.
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these are proposals to provide consumers with assistance from an
expert. 266 For example, mortgage borrowers might be required or
strongly encouraged to review proposed transactions with a
trusted advisor, such as an attorney or housing counselor.267 An
independent advisor could not only overcome some information
and bias problems, but could also counteract the psychological
manipulations of the broker or seller, such as identity group
marketing or selling approval rather than price.
26
The neutral counselor idea is being tried as this article is
being written. The Illinois legislature has adopted a law requiring
homeowners perceived as being vulnerable to predatory lending to
have an in-person meeting with a counselor prior to entering into
certain mortgage loans. 269 Originally the state regulator was
required to designate zip codes considered especially vulnerable to
predatory lending. 270 This requirement raised a hue and cry when
the designated zip codes were all primarily African-American
neighborhoods in Cook County (Chicago).271 New regulations have
been proposed that will direct counseling only for homeowners
being offered loans with nonstandard features, such as interest-
only, stated income or reduced income documentation, an
adjustable rate, or a prepayment penalty. 272 The opposition by
lenders has invoked the rational choice theory language of
autonomy in efforts to persuade consumers that it is the legislator,
rather than predatory lenders, who are victimizing minority
homeowners by imposing paternalistic requirements on their
access to credit. 273
266. ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 216, at 35-38.
267. Id. Another variant proposed is a second opinion hotline, providing contract
review by experts via telephone rather than in person. Id. at 36-38.
268. See id. at 38.
269. See generally 765 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (West 2008) (delineating the
Predatory lending database pilot program). The Illinois legislation has raised
tremendous opposition from the real estate and lending industry, as well as
community groups, who fear that the delays and costs resulting from mandatory
counseling will make mortgage lending and home buying and selling more difficult.
See Course Required for Some Home Hunters, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at
54; see also Lisa K. Bates & Shannon Van Zandt, Illinois' New Approach to
Regulating Predatory Lending: Unintended Consequences of Borrower Triggers &
Spatial Targeting (Univ. of Illinois Spatial Policy Analysis Research Consortium,
Working Paper No. 2007-02, 2007), available at
http://www.ace.uiuc.eduReap/SPARC/2007-02_BatesVanzandt.pdf
(discussing Illinois' approach to regulating predatory lending).
270. See Course Required for Some Home Hunters, supra note 269, at 54.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.; see also Amy Merrick, Borrowing Trouble: Illinois Tries New Tack
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The suitability proposal first put forth by Patricia McCoy and
Kathleen Enge1274 is intriguing because it addresses the
contracting situation (allowing the consumer to rely on the advice
of a credit broker to choose appropriate contract terms) and also
allows for nonenforcement after the fact, if a court finds a
transaction to have been unsuitable. 275 The proposal, analogizing
from the existing duties imposed on investment brokers, is to
require mortgage brokers and sellers to offer only loan
transactions that are suitable for the borrower, i.e., that provide
an appropriate benefit at an appropriate price with an appropriate
level of risk.276 Although the measure of suitability may be a
simple utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, it could also take account
of consumer biases and misperceptions of the objective benefits
and harms of a proposed transaction. 277
The law can also alter the contracting situation by removing
urgency and requiring reflection by the consumer. These
measures address, to some extent, affective load, decisional
overload, and premature commitment. In this category are
measures to allow the consumer time after contracting to cancel
the agreement, 278 or to provide mandatory disclosures far in
advance of the time for contracting. 279
The law can take advantage of the status quo or default
option bias, by creating safe or preferred default products and
contract terms. This can be done by regulations defining
"standard" products in each market. Also in this category is Oren
Bar-Gill's proposal to impose certain price structures on
unsolicited credit card offers. 28 0 To the extent that consumers are
more likely to sign credit card applications that arrive in the
mailbox than they are to seek out the best available card offerings
through independent research, this approach regulates the default
(or inertia) option and restricts the domain of "choice" to contracts
that are actively sought by consumers rather than passively
accepted.
Against Predatory Loans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at A10 (summarizing
opposition to the Illinois legislation).
274. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317-66 (2002).
275. Id. at 1337-39.
276. See id. at 1343.
277. See id. at 1317-66.
278. The Truth in Lending Act imposes a three-day cancellation right in all
residential mortgage refinancing transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000).
279. Willis, supra note 4, at 823-24.
280. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1373.
[Vol. 27:135
Behavior and Contract
The third approach to consumer protection is to regulate
contract terms directly, mandating, limiting, or prohibiting terms
including prices. The European Union's directive on unfair
contract terms relies on a combination of direct regulation and
after-the-fact nonenforcement by courts to protect consumers from
terms regarded as abusive. 281 The FTC's Credit Practices Rule is
another example of simply prohibiting terms that cannot be
viewed as benefiting consumers in the vast majority of
situations. 28 2 In addition to relying on agencies with expertise and
the empirical research to evaluate potential restrictions or bans,
consumer protection law could rely on negotiated rulemaking,
where stakeholders and their representatives (industry and
consumer advocates) could develop blacklists of contract terms, or
model contracts and pricing structures.
The fourth approach is regulating the outcome of consumer
contracts after the fact, typically by judicial decision. This
category obviously includes unconscionability and unfair and
deceptive practice litigation. It could also include the application
of strict liability doctrine to products that endanger consumer's
financial well-being as well as those that endanger health and
safety, a variant of the Financial Services Product Safety
Commission. Consumer contracts can and should be rewritten
when shown to have violated antidiscrimination laws, as in the
case of the fair lending claims against automobile finance
companies. 283
The traditional law and economics response to many of these
proposals is that they are paternalistic, and defeat the important
norm of consumer autonomy. If the law is to take account of the
real evidence that consumers in the unregulated market are
exploited and their welfare is often harmed, the full range of these
interventions needs to be seriously considered. The precautionary
principle that the market is to be preferred to regulation unless
the regulation can be shown to a certainty to improve aggregate
welfare is simply an expression of the discredited rational choice
theory of consumer markets, and of the exclusive pursuit of
efficiency without regard for other values.
281. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29-34 (EC).
282. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2007).
283. See generally Examples of Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. Litigation, supra note





Behavioral science shows us that setting boundaries for the
range of seller choices and controlling the situation in which
consumers choose makes real choice possible. Consider, for
example, a deregulated regime in which information overload,
seller obfuscation, a "decision" process where consumers have no
real information on contract terms until after they are emotionally
committed to a decision, and where the terms offered are so
complex that numerous non-salient and clearly harmful terms are
regularly included in services purchased. This describes today's
high-cost mortgage and credit card markets. Then consider an
alternative, regulated marketplace, where products are
sufficiently standardized by legal rules to reduce the domain of
choices to a manageable number, where terms that no reasonable
consumer would "prefer" are excluded ex ante by legal rules, and
where sellers are prevented in various ways from creating stress
and truncated reasoning by manipulating the time and place of
the consumer's contractual choice making. Does the second
scenario reduce the consumer's autonomy? Is the law's refusal to
set boundaries in the first scenario not "paternalistic?"
Paternalism is a false bogeyman. Consumer's choices will be
framed either by sellers or by legal rules. Allowing consumers the
freedom and autonomy to be manipulated and exploited does not
promote autonomy.
Equally important is the need to make equity and prevention
of exploitation an explicit norm in consumer contract law.
Knowing as we now do that exploitation is real, that sellers can
successfully and consistently impose harmful terms on consumers,
particularly vulnerable consumers, legal intervention need not
slavishly justify itself on grounds of repairing the broken market
in an endless chase after the chimera of efficiency or an
impossible-to-measure maximization of well-being. A new
normative paradigm for regulating consumer markets might
combine utilitarianism that looks at sufficiency rather than
maximization, 28 4 with robust values of autonomy and equity. If
banning unfair terms to protect the poor results in a greater dollar
loss to affluent consumers than the savings achieved for the poor,
284. In other words, a social welfare analysis that measures the extent to which
basic needs of all members of a society are met rather than simply summing up the
entire society's consumption. See MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 24-66 (1995); Paul Streeten, Basic Needs: Some UnsettledQuestions, 12 WORLD DEV. 973, 973 (1984).
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so be it. So long as lawmakers and judges are explicit and
transparent about the norms they are pursuing, there is no reason
that in the battle of competing goals, efficiency should always
come out the winner. 285 While utilitarianism and cost-benefit
analysis must continue to inform legal choices, they ought not to
dictate them.
285. See Jeremy Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 1441, 1460 (1990) (reviewing JULES J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE
LAW (1988)) ("What is unpalatable about [economic analysis of law] is not its
concern with efficiency, but its obsession with it to the exclusion of everything
else.").
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